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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
WALTER KAATMAN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 950155-CA 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Rule 
26(2)(a) Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Title 78, Chapter 2a, 
Section 3(2)(f) Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended), whereby the 
defendant in a district court criminal action may take an appeal to 
the Utah Court of Appeals from a final order from anything other 
than a first degree or a capital felony. In this case, final 
judgment and conviction was rendered by the Honorable Kenneth 
Rigtrup, a judge of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. The following issues and standards of review apply in 
this case: 
A. Was there a legally sufficient factual basis upon 
which the plea was taken? 
Standard of Review: Strict compliance with Rule 11 
requires a withdrawal of a guilty plea where the defendant does not 
have full knowledge of the consequences of his plea. Rule 11 
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further requires that a factual basis exist before the judge can 
accept a guilty plea. 
B. Was counsel ineffective in representing appellant 
before and at the time he entered his plea? 
Standard of Review: Where the claim of ineffective 
assistance is raised for the first time on direct appeal, the issue 
that must be decided is whether defendant was deprived of the 
effective assistance of counsel as a matter of law. The defendant 
must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires 
a showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 
functioning as the constitutional guarantee requires. Appellant 
must further show that the deficient performance prejudiced the 
defense. 
STATEMENT OF CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction for Retail 
Theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, 
Section 602 (1) Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended). 
On March 8, 1993, the defendant entered a plea of guilty to 
the charge of Retail Theft, a third degree felony. The appellant 
was ordered to undergo a 90-day diagnostic evaluation at the Utah 
State Prison. Following the evaluation, the appellant was committed 
to the Utah State Prison. 
Appellant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his plea of guilty 
and a Rule 65B(b) petition for post-conviction relief in August 
1993, claiming he received ineffective assistance of counsel in 
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connection with his guilty plea. The 65B(b) proceeding was stayed 
to allow the appellant to litigate his motion to withdraw his plea 
of guilty. 
After an evidentiary hearing on the motion to withdraw, Judge 
Rigtrup denied Mr. Kaatman's motion. The State moved for summary 
judgment in the 65B(b) case on the basis of res judicata and 
procedural bar (Mr. Kaatman failed to appeal the denial of the 
motion to withdraw). Mr. Kaatman claimed that David Sanders, who 
represented him on the motion to withdraw, failed to appeal on his 
behalf. Mr. Sanders could not remember whether he discussed the 
possibility of an appeal. Since a final order denying the motion 
to withdraw had never been prepared, Judge Rigtrup ordered that the 
State prepare an order so that Mr. Kaatman could pursue a direct 
appeal. Judge Rigtrup also ordered that LDA represent Mr. Kaatman 
on direct appeal. 
Based upon a conflict of interest, appellant was appointed 
present counsel to pursue this appeal. 
In March 1995, a hearing was conducted based upon the 
appellant's motion to withdraw his previously entered guilty plea. 
The State was represented by Kenneth Updegrove, Deputy District 
Attorney. Appellant was represented by David Sanders. Appellant 
testified in his own behalf. Appellant's attorney at the time he 
entered his guilty plea, Patrick Anderson, testified as did Deputy 
District Attorney Gregory Bown, who prosecuted the appellant. The 
Court made findings of fact and conclusions of law (attached 
hereto). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The pertinent facts to this appeal are as follows: 
The appellant was identified by a University Bookstore 
employee as the person who, on October 1, 1992, she had stopped 
leaving the bookstore with several textbooks. When asked if he had 
a receipt, the appellant said that he did not have a receipt but 
was going to buy them. The appellant had moved past the cashier 
but had not left the store. The appellant then moved back to a 
cash register line, dumped the books on a counter and left the 
store without paying for the books. The books, however, remained 
within the store. 
The appellant was also a suspect in book thefts from the BYU 
University Bookstore. At the hearing to withdraw his plea of 
guilty, representations were made by Deputy District Attorney 
Gregory Brown that as part of the plea agreement, additional 
charges would not be brought if the defendant pled guilty to the 
theft charge emanating from the University of Utah Bookstore. 
The defendant testified that he told his attorney, Patrick 
Anderson, that he was employed at Yosemite National Park at the 
time of the alleged theft. He gave him information as to the name 
of co-workers, however, the information was sketchy at best. 
(See paragraph 8, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law attached. 
Exhibit A) 
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Mr. Kaatman contends that the information he gave to Mr. 
Anderson was later confirmed to a degree by the attorney appointed 
to represent him on his rule 65B(b) Habeas proceeding, Mark Wagner, 
esq. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The factual recitation provided by defendant's counsel was 
insufficient to sustain the plea of guilty. The factual basis upon 
which the plea was taken did not constitute a crime. 
Defendant's counsel, as shown by the affidavit provided by 
Mark Wagner, was ineffective for not investigating his claim of 
alibi or attempting to contact the witnesses which were located by 
Mr. Wagner. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ACCEPTING THE DEFENDANT'S PLEA 
OF GUILTY WITHOUT AN ADEQUATE FACTUAL BASIS. 
A. THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE DEFENDANT'S PLEA OF GUILTY 
DEMONSTRATES AN INADEQUATE FACTUAL BASIS TO SUPPORT THE GUILTY 
PLEA. 
The defendant's recitation through counsel of the facts which 
would support a plea to the charge of Retail Theft were 
insufficient. The text of the plea is as follows: (see attached 
Exhibit B, dated March 8, 1993) 
p. 5 THE COURT: What are the underlying factual basis for 
this claim? 
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p.6 Mr. ANDERSON: Your Honor, Mr. Kaatman was at the 
University Bookstore, had a stack of 
books, he went beyond the cash registers, 
was at that point approached before he 
left the doors of the building. He was 
beyond the registers. He returned to the 
store, sat the books down and exited the 
store. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that by entering a 
guilty plea, you admit these facts? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Are those facts true? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State of Utah v. Breckenridge, 688 
P.2d 440 (1984) has clearly stated that a guilty plea must be 
supported by a factual basis. 
The Court stated in Breckenridge. et 440: 
The defendant appeals from a denial 
of his motion to set aside his plea 
of guilty to a charge of arson. The 
dispositive question is whether a 
conviction based on a plea may stand 
where there is no record of facts 
showing that the charged crime was 
actually committed by the defendant, 
or that the defendant has for some 
other legitimate reason 
intelligently and voluntarily 
entered such a plea. See North 
Carolina v. Alford 400 U.S. 25,91 
S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed 2d 16Z (1970). 
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As in Breckenridqe, the defendant's right to due process were 
violated by the Court accepting a guilty plea without an adequate 
factual basis. In Breckenridqe the Court stated: 
The general rule that constitutional 
issues not raised at trial cannot be 
raised on appeal is excepted to when 
a person's liberty is at stake. 
(Citation omitted). Here 
Breckenridge' s felony conviction and 
sentence rest on the outcome of his 
appeal. We will therefore address 
the issue of the adequacy of his 
plea on this newly raised ground, 
(at 443). 
The Court went on to find the plea to be constitutionally 
insufficient, citing State v. Harris. 585 P.2d 450, 452 (1978.) 
The Court further found that Rule 11(e)(4) of the Utah Rules and 
Criminal Procedures specifically states ... 
"that the court shall not accept .... a plea 
[of guilty] until the court has made findings, 
(4) That the defendant understands the nature 
and elements of the offense to which he is 
entering his plea" 
While the Court in this case made a finding that the plea was 
knowingly and voluntarily made, the Court could not have correctly 
found that Kaatman could have understood the elements of the 
offense. 
Kaatman's response to the clerk at the University Bookstore 
was that he intended to buy the books. He returned to the 
cashier's counter and placed the books down. It is not on record 
how long he stayed, but it is totally consistent with the innocent 
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action of one who decides not to wait in line and leaves. 
The pertinent statute reads as follows: 
76-6-602 Retail theft, acts constituting. 
A person commits the offense of retail theft 
when he knowingly: 
(1) Takes possession of, conceals, carries 
away, transfers or causes to be carried away 
or transferred, any merchandise displayed, 
held, stored or offered for sale in a retail 
mercantile establishment with the intention of 
retaining such merchandise or with the 
intention of depriving the merchant 
permanently of the possession, use or benefit 
of such merchandise without paying the retail 
value of such merchandise 
Kaatman's actions in the bookstore do not constitute a crime. 
There is no factual basis to sustain the plea. The books never 
left the store, they were not secreted nor were price tags altered 
or changed. There could be no intention to permanently deprive the 
owner thereof under these facts. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE BECAUSE HE 
FAILED TO INVESTIGATE DEFENDANT'S CLAIM OF 
ALIBI. 
Ordinarily, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are 
addressed by collateral attack in habeas corpus proceedings; 
however, in some circumstances the claims may be raised on appeal. 
State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 487 (Ut.Ct.App. 1991). Such 
circumstances exist when the defendant is represented by new 
counsel on appeal and the trial record is adequate on the issues. 
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 P.2d 125, 133-34 (3d 
Cr. 1984). Such is the case in this appeal. 
The standard for review on claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel are embodied in the holding in Strickland v. Washington. 
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984): 
First, the defendant mush show that counsel's performance was 
deficient. This requires a showing that counsel made errors so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" 
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the 
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced 
the defense. This requires showing the counsel's errors were 
so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a 
trial whose result is reliable. 
See also State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). 
A. DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL MADE SERIOUS ERROR 
FOR FAILING TO INVESTIGATE THE DEFENDANT'S 
CLAIM THAT HE WAS WORKING IN YOSEMITE NATIONAL 
PARK AT THE TIME OF THE ALLEGED THEFT. 
The trial court found that the defendant did not give his 
counsel adequate information in order to investigate his claim. 
See paragraph 8 (Exhibit B) 
However, the defendant claimed that he gave the same 
information to an attorney appointed to represent him on a habeas 
corpus proceeding. The attorney appointed to represent Mr. Kaatman 
on the habeas corpus proceeding has filed an affidavit, attached 
hereto, (Exhibit C) which details his involvement in the 
defendant's case. It is clear from this affidavit that Mr. Wagner 
was able to ascertain not only the existence of the two witnesses, 
but was also able to verify the employment of the defendant around 
the time of the alleged theft merely by placing a few phone calls. 
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Counsel for defendant has an absolute duty to investigate his 
client's case. Strickland, supra. 
In this case the defendant gave enough information to Mr. 
Wagner to allow him to determine through cursory investigation that 
two people with whom the defendant worked did, in fact, exist. He 
was able to determine that the defendant was in fact employed by 
the agency he claimed employed him. He was able to determine the 
approximate dates of his employment and that in order to travel the 
distance necessary to be back in Salt Lake City from Yosemite would 
require a great deal of effort by the defendant. Had those 
witnesses been interviewed by defendant's counsel, his advise to 
plead guilty may have been different. 
CONCLUSION 
POINT I 
Defendant's plea of guilty was taken in violation of Rule 11 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, there existed no factual basis 
supported by the record which could validate the guilty plea. The 
record, in fact, supports defendant's contention that the facts 
offered as the factual basis to support the plea were insufficient. 
They did not make out the crime of Retail Theft. 
POINT II 
Defense counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate 
defendant's claim of alibi. Mark Wagner's affidavit shows that 
alibi witnesses were located by simply placing a few phone calls. 
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Respectfully Submitted, 
DATED this J l * C day of 1995, 
EVIN J. KURUMADA ' 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
(by Jerold D. McPhee, Esq. in his 
absence) 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Mailed two copies of the forgoing Brief of Appellant to the 
Assistant Attorney General's Office, 236 State 
Capital, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 this, j 2$. day of 
1995. 
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ADDENDUM A 
EXHIBIT A 
ANGELA F. MICKLOS (6229) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1021 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
WALTER T. KAATMAN, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER 
Case No. 931900148 FS 
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
The above-captioned matter came before the Court on April 11, 
1994 for an evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea. The State was represented by Kenneth Updegrove, 
Deputy Salt Lake County (now District) Attorney1. Defendant was 
present and represented by David Sanders. Defendant testified on 
his own behalf. Patrick Anderson and Gregory Bcwn were called and 
sworn to testify at the State's request. Based upon the testimony 
of the witnesses, the Court now enters the following: 
xThis order has been prepared by the Attorney General's 
Office at the request of the Court as part of the relief granted in 
Mr. Kaatman's petition for post-conviction relief (case no 
930904595 HC). 
TYAtd Judicial Distncl 
MAR 1 0 1995 
Deputy C a * 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On March 8, 1993, defendant pled guilty to retail theft, 
a third degree felony. 
2. Defendant was represented by Patrick Anderson. The 
prosecutor was Greg Bown, Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney. 
3. On July 15, 1993, defendant was sentenced to serve 0-5 
years at the Utah State Prison. 
4. In exchange for defendant's guilty plea, the State agreed 
not to file two second degree felony charges: a theft by deception 
encompassing the sale, at the U of U bookstore, of books defendant 
had allegedly stolen from BYU bookstore; and a potential Utah 
County case for the actual theft of the books from BYU bookstore. 
5. Mr. Anderson received all the police reports in the third 
degree felony, as well as in the second degree felonies that were 
still under investigation. 
6. Defendant told Mr. Anderson that defendant had been in 
Yosemite during the period of time that the third degree felony was 
committed. 
7. Mr. Anderson asked defendant for potential alibi 
witnesses. Defendant provided Mr. Anderson only with the name of 
Jim who worked somewhere in Yosemite. Defendant told Mr. Anderson 
that defendant's roommate and employer from Yosemite could help 
verify the information, but defendant did not remember their names. 
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Mr. Anderson told defendant that he needed more information in 
order to have an investigator look into it. 
8. The information concerning the potential alibi witnesses 
was vague and indefinite at best. Defendant did not give Mr. 
Anderson enough information upon which to proceed. Mr. Anderson 
testified that if defendant had given him more information 
regarding potential alibi witnesses, he would have made a request 
with LDA for an investigator. Thereafter, the investigator would 
have made contact with the individuals whose names had been 
provided. 
9. Mr. Anderson did not tell defendant that defendant needed 
to provide money for the investigation of alibi witnesses. 
10. Mr. Anderson was concerned about the pending theft by 
deception charge based upon letters defendant had sent to the 
prosecutor indicating that defendant knew who had stolen the books. 
In Mr. Anderson's opinion, defendant stood a good chance of being 
convicted of the second degree theft by deception. Mr. Anderson 
explained his concerns to defendant. 
11. Mr. Bown is a fairly thorough, aggressive prosecutor. 
Based on such, Mr. Anderson's advice to defendant regarding che 
likelihood of being convicted of the second degree theft by 
deception was reasonable. 
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12. Mr. Anderson fully explained to defendant the details and 
ramifications of the plea agreement. 
13. Mr. Anderson met with defendant at the jail and in the 
holding cell prior to the various court proceedings that were held 
in this matter. 
14. Defendant was indecisive about whether to take the plea 
bargain, but the plea appeared, in Mr. Anderson's opinion, to be 
voluntary. 
15. Mr. Anderson outlined the pros and cons of accepting the 
plea bargain and left the ultimate decision up to defendant. Mr. 
Anderson did not threaten defendant. 
16. During the plea colloquy, the Court advised defendant of 
the 30-day time-period in which to move to withdraw the guilty 
plea. Defendant acknowledged the Court's statement. 
17. On August 12, 1993, defendant filed a pro se motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. 
18. Defendant understood that if he pled guilty to the third 
degree felony theft, the prosecutor would not file second degree 
felony charges. 
19. The prosecution did not file the second degree felony 
charges and, thus, honored the plea agreement. 
20. Defendant pled guilty in order to avoid the possibility 
of a 1-15 year sentence on the second degree theft by deception 
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charge. Defendant avoided a possible 1-15 year sentence by 
pleading guilty. Defendant's reason for pleading guilty is 
rational. 
21. Defendant told the Court, at the time he pled guilty, 
that he was satisfied with the advice of his attorney. 
22. The Court properly advised defendant of his rights during 
the plea colloquy. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendant's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. 
2. Defendant received effective assistance of counsel. 
Defendant failed to demonstrate deficient performance. 
3. Defendant failed to demonstrate good cause warranting 
withdrawal of his guilty plea. 
ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court denies defendant's motion 
to withdraw his guilty plea. 
DATED this (0 --day of March, 1995. 
5 
Approved as to form: 
/rtark A. Wagner, Esq.Jf 
Attorney for defendant in 
case no. 930904595 HC 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the i • i ' day of February, 1995, a 
true and accurate copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER was mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
David G. Angerbauer, Esq. 
Mark A. Wagner, Esq. 
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE 
Attorneys for petitioner 
185 S. State St., Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0019 
InU 1 '.(.fit! 
2Mark Wagner represented petitioner in the post-conviction 
case (930904595 HC). The drafting of the foregoing findings and 
conclusions was ordered by the Court as the relief in connection 
with the post-conviction case. Therefore, the findings and 
conclusions are to be submitted to Mr. Wagner for approval, rather 
than to Mr. Sanders (who represented defendant during the 
evidentiary hearing). Mr. Wagner has a copy of the transcript of 
the April 11, 1994 evidentiary hearing. 
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ADDENDUM A 
EXHIBIT B 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR* 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF Uy 
* * * 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
7 WALTER T. KAATMAN, 
8 Defendant. 
Case No. 931900148FS 
PLEA, 3-8-93 
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11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 8th day of 
March, 1993, at 2:30 o'clock p.m., this cause came on 
for hearing before the HONORABLE KENNETH RIGTRUP, 
District Court, without a jury in the Salt Lake County 
Courthouse, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
17 A P P E A R A N C E S : 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 CAT by 
24 
25 
For the State: 
For the Defendant 
GREGORY BOWN 
Attorney at Law 
PATRICK L. ANDERSON 
Attorney at Law 
CARLTON S . WAY, CSR, RPR HUB DISTEICT COURT 
Thkd Judicial District 
OCT H 1993 
&&) 
_ / intw/ Clark 
1 P"R-Q-C--E--E--D-^T-N-G'-S 
2 THE COURT: Mr. Kaatman, the Court 
3 understands that you are prepared at this time to 
4 change your plea; is that true? 
5 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
6 THE COURT: Do you want to state, 
7 Counsel, what the understanding is? 
8 MR. ANDERSON: Your Honor, it is our 
9 understanding that for a change of plea in this case 
10 to a plea as charged to the Retail Theft, a third 
11 degree felony, that the State has agreed to not file 
12 any additional charges associated with some alleged 
13 activity around December 16th associated with a book 
14 buy-back in the bookstore as alleged in Utah County. 
15 THE COURT: Is that your understanding 
16 MR, BOWN: It is, your Honor. 
17 THE COURT: Is there any understanding 
18 about restitution beyond this case? 
19 THE BOWN: No. The books were seized 
20 what books there were were seized and taken back. 
21 THE COURT: Do you understand, 
22 Mr. Kaatman, that as part of the sentencing, the Cou 
23 will require you to pay for any losses sustained, if 
24 there are any? 
25 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
2 
1 THE COURT: Is your true and correct 
2 name Walter T. Kaatman? 
3 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
4 THE COURT: Your age? 
5 THE DEFENDANT: 33, sir. 
6 THE COURT: What is your education? 
7 THE DEFENDANT: College, sir. Three 
8 years of college, sir. 
9 THE COURT: Do you read, speak and 
10 understand the English Language? 
11 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
12 THE COURT: Are you under the influen 
13 of alcohol or drugs? 
14 THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 
15 THE COURT: Do you have any mental 
16 diseases or defects which would impair your ability 
17 enter a knowing, intelligent and an informed plea i 
18 this matter? 
19 THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 
20 THE COURT: Have there been any offer 
21 agreements or inducements of any kind that the Stat 
22 of Utah has held out to you to cause you to want to 
23 enter a guilty plea at this time other than what's 
24 just been stated on the record? 
25 THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 
3 
1 THE COURT: Has there been any thteats 
2 or acts of force, duress, coercion or undue influence 
3 of any kind been brought to bear to cause you to want 
4 to enter a guilty plea? 
5 THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 
6 THE COURT: If you enter the guilty plea 
7 as outlined, the Court could impose upon you an 
8 indeterminate sentence of zero to five years in the 
9 Utah State Penitentiary, a fine of up to $5,000, a 
10 Surcharge of $4,250, all of those or a combination of 
11 all of those; do you understand that? 
12 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
13 THE COURT: Even though your attorney, 
14 the State's attorney and Adult Probation & Parole 
15 Department were to all make a more lenient 
16 recommendation, the Court would nonetheless be 
17 empowered to impose the maximum penality prescribed by 
18 law as I've just outlined it to you; do you understand 
19 that? 
20 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
21 THE COURT: And any agreements between 
22 you, your attorney and the State of Utah are not 
23 binding upon the Court; do you understand that? 
24 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
25 THE COURT: You have a right to continue 
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1 with a not-guilty plea; do you understand that? 
2 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir* 
3 THE COURT: If you were to do that, the 
4 State would be required to prove each and every 
5 element of the alleged crime beyond a reasonable 
6 doubt; do you understand that? 
7 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
8 THE COURT: Do you want to state the 
9 elements of the alleged crime? 
10 MR. ANDERSON: Your Honor, that on or 
11 about October 1st, 1992, at the University of Utah 
12 Bookstore, which is in Salt Lake County, Mr. Kaatman 
13 took possession of property* It was his intent to 
14 deprive them thereof. The property was of a value of 
15 more than 250, but less than 1,000. 
16 THE COURT: Do you understand those to 
17 be the elements of the alleged crime? 
18 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
19 THE COURT: Do you understand that by 
20 entering a guilty plea, you relieve the State of that 
21 burden of proving those elements beyond a reasonable 
22 doubt? 
23 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
24 THE COURT: What are the underlying 
25 factual bases for this claim? 
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1 MR. ANDERSON: Your Honor, Mr. KSatman 
2 was at the University Bookstore, had a stack of books, 
3 he went beyond the cash registers, was at that point 
4 approached before he left the doors of the building. 
5 He was beyond the registers. He returned to the 
6 store, sat the books down and exited the store. 
7 THE COURT: Do you understand that by 
8 entering a guilty plea, you admit those facts? 
9 THE DEFENDANT: Y e s , sir. 
10 THE COURT: Are those facts true? 
11 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
12 THE COURT: Is it your desire to enter a 
13 guilty plea because you feel that you are, in fact, 
14 guilty? 
15 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
16 THE COURT: You have certain rights 
17 which are set forth in writing in the written Guilty 
18 Plea. Have you read those? 
19 THE DEFENDANT: Y e s , sir. 
20 THE COURT: Have they been explained to 
21 you by Mr. Anderson? 
22 THE DEFENDANT: Y e s , sir. 
23 THE COURT: Do you feel that you 
24 understand those rights? 
25 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
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1 THE COURT: Principal among those" rights 
2 are a right to a trial by jury; do you understand 
3 that? 
4 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
5 THE COURT: The right to observe 
6 witnesses testify against you in open court and to 
7 have your attorney cross-examine those witnesses; do 
8 you understand that? 
9 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
10 THE COURT: You would have the right to 
11 have witnesses produced in your behalf at State 
12 expense; do you understand that? 
13 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
14 THE COURT: Do you further understand 
15 that at no time during the trial would you be 
16 compelled to testify or produce any evidence against 
17 yourself; do you understand that? 
18 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
19 THE COURT: Should an adverse verdict 
20 occur, you would have a period of 30 days in which to 
21 appeal the adverse verdict; do you understand that? 
22 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
23 THE COURT: You also have the right to 
24 an attorney at every stage of the proceedings. Have 
25 you been so represented? 
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1 THE DEFENDANT: Yes# sir. 
2 THE COURT: Are you satisfied with the 
3 advice of your attorney? 
4 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
5 THE COURT: Do you need any additional 
6 time to confer with your attorney? 
7 THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 
8 THE COURT: Do you understand that by 
9 entering a guilty plea at this time, you waive all of 
10 those rights? 
11 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
12 THE COURT: What is your plea to Retail 
13 Theft, a third degree felony? 
14 THE DEFENDANT: Guilty, sir. 
15 THE COURT: Do you need your hand 
16 released to sign the Guilty Plea? 
17 THE DEFENDANT: No, I can reach it, sir. 
18 THE COURT: The record may reflect that 
19 Walter T. Kaatman has entered a guilty plea to Retail 
20 Theft, a third degree felony. It appears to the Court 
21 that said plea was knowingly and voluntarily made, the 
22 Court so finds. 
23 The record may reflect that the plea has 
24 been executed in writing in the presence of the 
25 Court. It will be received and made a part of the 
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1 record, herein. 
2 The Court has explained to the Defendant 
3 his rights. It appears to the Court that the 
4 Defendant understands those rights. The Court finds 
5 that hefs knowingly and voluntarily waived those 
6 r ights . 
7 You have a statutory period of 30 days 
8 in which, for good cause shown, you may withdraw your 
9 Guilty Plea. Do you understand that? 
10 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
11 THE COURT: The Court must impose 
12 sentence in not less than two days nor more than 30 
13 days. Do you waive the statutory time in which to be 
14 sentenced? 
15 MR. ANDERSON: Yes, your Honor. It's 
16 pretty close to the day. Mr. Kaatman is in jail at 
17 this time. This is the only thing that's holding him. 
18 THE COURT: The matter will be referred 
19 to Adult Probation & Parole Department for a 
20 presentence report; sentencing April the 5th at 2:00 
21 p.m. 
22 MR. ANDERSON: Your Honor, I would 
23 request Mr. Kaatman be released to Pretrial Services 
24 pending the sentencing. He does have a job. He's a 
25 baker. And he has a job at Albertson's. Also, his 
9 
1 parents reside in Salt Lake, and he has a place' to 
2 reside. Mr. Bown had indicated to me previously that 
3 he had no objection to that, that he fs reviewed the 
4 records. 
5 Mr. Kaatman did serve some time in the 
6 Utah State Prison back in 1983. It was not for a 
7 theft-related charge, however. And up until this last 
8 year, he has not had any additional charges. We'd 
9 respectfully request that the Court release him. He 
10 has never failed to appear for any hearings. And he 
11 has been supervised by Pretrial before. 
12 THE COURT: Mr. Bown? 
13 MR. BOWN: Your Honor, I'm aware of two 
14 factors that mitigate against release: One, is the 
15 prior commitment. I will look through my file to see 
16 what that was for. I'll see if I can quickly find 
17 that, again. 
18 MR. ANDERSON: It was a zero to five. 
19 He served almost five years of that charge. 
20 MR. BOWN: The other aggravating factor 
21 is that while this offense was done -- that around the 
22 same time of the time he was arrested in December 16, 
23 as we described, there was also pending a warrant for 
24 issuing a bad check. He pled guilty on December 24th 
25 in front of Judge Casey. 
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1 Both things concern the State. It 
2 appears that Pretrial was unwilling to supervise him 
3 because he was on probation at the time. With a bond 
4 set at $5,000, I think that is an appropriate amount. 
5 The Court -- I think before the Court 
6 orders Pretrial to take him, we ought to have some 
7 imput as to whether or not they will take him. 
8 THE COURT: Contact Pretrial Services, 
9 .Connie. Tell them if they think he otherwise 
10 qualifies and they are willing to take him, I will 
11 release him to Pretrial Services. 
12 MR. ANDERSON: Thank you, your Honor. 
13 (Hearing adjourned.) 
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I, CARLTON S. WAY, CSR, do hereby certify that 
I am a Certified Shorthand Reporter and a Notary 
Public in and for the State of Utah; 
That I took down the proceedings aforesaid at 
the time and place therein named and thereafter 
reduced the same to print by means of computer-aided 
transcription (CAT) under my direction and control; 
I further certify that I have no interest in 
the event of this action. 
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL this the 13th day of 
October, 1993. 
(Signature) 
CARLTON S WAYXC^I, RPR 
CARLTON WAY 
Notary Public 
STATE OF UTAH 
My Commission Expires 
November 18.1994 
«78thAw.SlC,UTWI03 J 
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ADDENDUM A 
EXHIBIT C 
KEVIN J. KURUMADA #1867 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
431 South 300 East, #101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 322-1616 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
WALTER T. KAATMAN, 
De fendant/Appe11ant. 
i AFFIDAVIT OF 
i MARK A. WAGNER 
i Case No. 950155-CA 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Mark A. Wagner, being first duly sworn, deposes and states 
as follows: 
1. I am a member in good standing of the Utah State Bar 
and have been since I was first admitted to practice in the State 
of Utah in 1992. 
2. On or about August 2, 1994, the Honorable Kenneth 
Rigtrup appointed David G. Angerbauer of the law firm Kimball, 
Parr, Waddoups, Brown & Gee to act as counsel to assist 
petitioner Walter Theodore Kaatman III (hereinafter "Kaatman") in 
connection with Kaatman's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
3. I assisted David Angerbauer in connection with this 
matter, have personal knowledge of all matters stated herein, and 
am in all respects competent to make this affidavit. 
4. On or about September 12, 1994, I spoke with Kaatman 
regarding his claim that he was working in California on the date 
of the offense for which he was charged. 
5. Kaatman said that at the time of the offense, he worked 
for the Yosemite & Curry Company located in or near Yosemite 
National Park, California. Kaatman informed me that he was 
acquainted with a Duane and a Cindy, who he believed were 
married, while working for the Yosemite & Curry Company and that 
they could confirm his presence in California on the date of the 
alleged offense. Kaatman informed me that he could not remember 
their last names but that he believed Duane was a sauce chef at 
the Awahnee Hotel and that Cindy was employed at the front desk. 
6. Following that conversation, I called directory 
assistance and requested the general number for the Yosemite & 
Curry Company in Yosemite National Park. I was informed that the 
name of the Yosemite & Curry Company had been changed to Yosemite 
Concession Services and that their number was (209) 252-4848. I 
also requested the telephone number for the Yosemite Concession 
Services Human Resources Department and was given the number 
(209) 372-1236. 
7. I called the number given me for the Human Resources 
Department and asked if their records showed Kaatman as a former 
employee. I was informed that their records showed that Kaatman 
was employed by Yosemite Concession Services from July of 1992 
through September 24, 1992. 
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8. I also called the general information number given me 
by directory assistance and asked to speak to Cindy at the front 
desk. I was informed that Cindy was not at work that day but I 
could try to reach her at home. I requested Cindy's last name 
and was informed that her last name was McFann. 
9. I once again called directory assistance and requested 
a telephone number for Duane and Cindy McFann in Yosemite, 
California. I was informed that their number is (209) 372-8632. 
I called the number given to me and reached the home of Duane and 
Cindy McFann. 
10. Cindy McFann informed me that she was acquainted with 
Kaatman and that he had worked for Yosemite Concession Services. 
Ms. McFann also informed me that she remembered Kaatman being 
present in California sometime around the date of the alleged 
offense but could not recall the specific dates. 
DATED this I**- day of July, 1995. 
/Mark A. Wagner 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this \2'^ day of July, 
1995. 
"""" Notary Public J 
WENDY M.VONKHRUM | 185 Souft State #1300 I \ I IAA 
Saft Lake City. Utah 641II ! I L J fY) , ^ A . 
My Commission Expires • U . / ^ M A A V — I ' I- J\ WW. 
September 18,1997 | NOTARY P U B L I C 
stateofutah , Res id ing " i n 
My Commission Expires: 
m u mi a 
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